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FOREWORD 
This "Information Service" has been initiated and established 
by the Chief of Naval Personnel for the benefit of officers unable to 
attend the Naval War College. 
In this and subsequent issues will be found selected articles of 
value to all officers. Many of these articles will be outstanding lec­
tures delivered at the Naval War College and other service 
institutions. 
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THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 
An article by 
Vice Admiral D. B. Beary, U. S. N. 
A Board recently met in the Navy Department to select a 
group of officers of demonstrated ability to attend the next 10-
month course at the Naval War College. This course will start at 
Newport, Rhode Island, on August 12, 1949. Here, while free from 
the pressure of everyday military duties, the selected officers will 
study the art and science of war in its broadest aspects. Through 
the study and solution of military problems they will have the 
opportunity to improve their ability to think, to increase their pro­
fessional stature, and thus to prepare themselves for the duties and 
responsibilities of high command. Any officer fortunate enough to 
be selected for this assignment can look forward to one of the most 
interesting and profitable years of his entire career. 
Perhaps it is significant that when the Naval War College 
was established in 1884 the Industrial Revolution was just hitting 
its stride. The full impact of steam, electricity and the internal 
combustion engine was only beginning to be felt. There followed 
a swift march of scientific and industrial events that brought with 
it the telephone, radio and the fulfillment of Man's long urge to fly. 
This coupled with the development of mass armies, powerful navies 
of great mobility, great air fleets, and later, atomic energy, has re­
sulted in revolutionary changes in the techniques of warfare. The 
total effect of all these factors threatens to overwhelm military 
thought and cause it to lose pace. '.{'he military student is tempted 
Ad:iniral Beary is President _of the Naval War College. Prior to as­
suming his duties at the Naval War College he served as Com­
mandant Twelfth Naval District and Commander Western Sea 
Frontier. During the war he commanded Service Squadron Six in the 
Pacific and the Operational Training Command in the Atlantic. 
1 
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to become so preoccupied with the study of technical developments in 
weapons that he is in danger of losing his breadth of vision. Under 
these circumstances military thinkers may forget that weapons are 
merely the implements of war and ignore the continued need for a 
profound understanding of the overall strategy of war. They may 
overlook the fact that, throughout the remarkable scientific and in­
dustrial advance of the past few generations, two factors have re­
mained constant-the human mind and the geography of the Globe. 
The mind of Man is still the motivating force behind all 
weapons, and our preoccupation with atomic energy should not blind 
us to this fact. The pattern of future victories and def eats will con­
tinue to originate in that imperfect human machine which has fol­
lowed much the same pattern of behavior since Man first learned to 
fight.· 
The second constant, the geography of the Globe, is also most 
important. Land is still the habitat of Man, and so long as it re­
mains so, the final objectives of war will be land objectives. Nor 
have the seas that cover three-fourths of the surface of the Earth 
ceased to be an important factor in modern civilization. Sea power 
is the instrument with which Man has been able to adapt the broad 
sea expanses of the Globe to his own uses. Sea power means ships­
ships that carry !=',irplanes, ships that carry projectiles (and, in the 
foreseeable future, guided missiles), ships that carry armies and the 
logistics necessary to support war; and above all, ships that carry 
the great bulk of world trade, the backbone of modern civilization in 
peace and fo war. 
The decisive weapon of modern sea power is air power. That 
decisive combination known as sea-air power is a weapon whose 
potentialities have only begun to become apparent. Today no �ec­
tion of the Globe, however remote, can be considered insulated from 
2 
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the influence of this sea-air weapon. As our technological know­
how continues to expand, the ways in which the broad sea areas of 
the Globe can be used in peace and in war will inevitably multiply. 
Thus in an age when our attention is centered on spectacu-
. lar scientific advances there is greater need than ever to clarify our 
thinking on the fundamentals of war and the problems of command. 
The quality of the commander is a decisive factor in the conduct 
of war. It is still he, the commander, who must do the planning 
for war. It is still he who must direct and coordinate the weapons 
of war. It is still he upon whose ability will hinge victory or defeat. 
The Naval War College has long been dedicated to the task of insur­
ing that qualified officers of all services who attend its courses are 
given the opportunity to attain the breadth of understanding and 
vision so essential to victory in war. While there, our future com­
manders are able to study the strategy, tactics and logistics of sea 
power and to relate the role of sea power to the broader field of 
global warfare. 
The Naval War College conducts three courses, the Senior 
and Junior courses in Strategy and Tactics and, of equal importance, 
the Logistics course. All courses are closely integrated with one 
another. The curriculum includes a study of weapons, geography, 
international relations, intelligence, communications, all phases of 
logistics, and atomic energy. The strategic problems are joint 
problems, involving not only all branches of the armed services but 
also various other agencies of government. 
New developments and new ideas are weighed and discussed 
in an atmosphere of complete freedom of thought and speech. No 
dogma, doctrine or preconceived formulae with which to achieve vic­
tory are taught. Officers of all services are encouraged to express 
themselves freely in the numerous critiques and discussion periods 
scheduled throughout the course. Differences of opinion and divided 
3 
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conclusions are encouraged rather than discouraged. They are con­
sidered stimulating and helpful in our search for solutions to the 
pressing and puzzling problems we face today. Without these hon­
est d_ifferences, freely expressed, there would exist a fatal weakness 
within our entire :military establishment. No individual or group of 
individuals is expected to go along with the popular current of 
opinion. Each is free to reach his own conclusion based on his 
own logic and the facts as he has been able to determine them. 
Each is required to think for himself and to apply his own reason­
ing power to the solution of military problems. 
The philosophy of the Naval War College can be summed up 
in the simple statement that we must never permit our thinking to 
become static. There must be a constant boil and ferment of new 
ideas. Old ideas and concepts must be subjected to the most care­
ful scrutiny. Newer and better solutions to our problems must 
always be sought, and when they are found, there must still be the 
dissatisfaction of knowing there are better answers yet to be 
found. 
The Naval War College is the catalytic agent through which 
officers, who possess the energy and the perspective, can achieve 
that mental stature so essential to the exercise of high command. 
4 
Note: This article is reprinted by permission of the "Army and Navy 
Journal." 
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ECONOMIC WARFARE - THE ATTACK 
A lecture delivered by 
Prof. Charles Cortez Abbott 
at the Naval War College 
October 21, 1948 
Professor Spiegel in his book, The Economics of Total War, 
defines this subject as follows: 
"Economic warfare is designed to destroy the enemy's 
economic war potential by physically destroying war es-
sential assets and by blockading supplies from abroad ........ " 
It "requires the coordinated blending of military and econ­
omic measures." 
Colonel Clabaugh of the faculty of the Industrial College of 
the Armed Forces in a recent lecture in that college's Economic 
Mobilization course said: 
" ...... so far as the literal and figurative meaning of the 
words is concerned, the term 'economic warfare' could have 
been applied to economic mobilization for war or to pro­
duction or even to commercial rivalry in peace. But cus­
tom and usage make language as well as law. Long before 
we entered the war, in fact before the outbreak of war in 
Europe, economic warfare had come to mean the strangula­
tion of the enemy-blockade, literally, by ships at sea and 
figuratively, by diplomatic and economic measures. 'Econ­
omic warfare' should be used only in the special meaning 
given to it by custom and usage ....... ,Briefly, it is 'the sum 
of all those measures which injure the enemy's war po­
tential.' " 
In order to place economic warfare in some perspective, it 
may serve a useful purpose at this point to make a number of ob­
servations regarding it. Economic warfare of course is not a new 
Professor. Abbott has been on the faculty of Harvard University 
since 1932-for the past several years as Professor of Business 
Economics. 
6 
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development. It is probably as old as warfare itself. Certainly in 
Plutarch's account of the wars of the Greeks and the Persians 
there are numerous happenings which we would characterize as fall­
ing within the orbit of economic warfare. In the Napoleonic wars 
measures of ,economic attack and defense played a prominent part, 
and in our own Civil War the blockade of the South was of very 
great consequence. 
With the passage of time, the realignment of nations, and 
the development of new weapons, economic warfare continually 
changes its form. The development of air power and of submarine 
warfare has of. course greatly widened its scope and objectives. On 
the other hand, total war on a global scale has tended to diminish the 
feasibility of naval blockade in the older, narrower sense of blockad­
ing a hostile coast line and has fostered a growth of new measures 
which I will speak of in a moment. 
It has been commonly observed that economic warfare en­
compasses many ordinary peacetime practices of business, such as 
foreign investment; patent interchange agreements,establishment of 
branch plants.in foreign countries, and commercial relationships of 
many kinds. At the other extreme are operations of a strictly mili­
tary character, undertaken in wartime., that possess an economic 
purpose, such as submarine warfare and the air attacks on the Ger­
man synthetic oil plants at Leuna in the last war. In between these 
extremes come such operations as our efforts to deprive the Axis of 
Spanish and Portuguese wolfram through preclusive buying, or our 
efforts through the use of ship warrants and denial of bunkering 
facilities to force the Argentines to employ their merchant tonnage 
in shipping services advantageous to us. 
In general, the effectiveness of economic warfare increases 
or decreases directly in proportion to the military strength and suc­
cess of the nation or alliance. Many illustrations of the validity of 
6 
-7
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this proposition can be found. For example, the character of the 
trade agreements which the United States was able to negotiate 
with neutrals-Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey­
changed rapidly and in our favor between 1942 and 1944 as allied 
military successes increased. As fortune favored our arms it was 
possible to put increasing pressure on neutral countries and areas 
and, consequently, progressively to deprive the Axis of essential raw 
materials. This observation perhaps is nothing more than a further 
confirmation of the fact that economic warfare in itself can probab­
ly never be a decisive factor independent of military action, although 
it can very substantially contribute to military successes. 
Probably economic warfare is most successful when a partic­
ular action is undertaken on such a �cale and so rapidly that the 
economy attacked has no chance to accommodate itself to the blow 
or to develop substitute materials or alternative trade routes or con­
nections, with the result that the effects of a sudden and unexpected 
action tend to become cumulative. If the country is suddenly and 
completely cut off from some item such as ball bearings, or if all 
foreign trade relationships with neutrals are swiftly and violently 
distorted, the effects on a country's economy will be very far reach­
ing, particularly in a military sense. Reasoning of this type is of 
course one of the bases for apprehension regarding a sneak attack 
on industrial areas in the United States. 
On the other hand, it is easy to overestimate the effects of 
particular operations designed to accomplish economic dislocation. 
The strategic bombing of German industry and transport prior to 
the spring of 1944, for example, seemingly injured the German 
economy much less than was currently believed in this cou�try. A
commonly quoted judgment of one of the officials of the British 
Ministry of Economic Warfare is to the effect that MEW did not un­
derestimate Germany's needs or resources, but that German in-
7 
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genuity in developing substitutes for critical materials and com­
ponents was greatly underestimated. 
It is clear, of course, that there are two bases for economic 
warfare. The first may be described as the economic and business 
facts characteristic of a nation's economy. Economic and commer­
cial geography, sources of raw materials, peacetime trade flows, 
commercial and banking connections of important companies, the 
location of key plants and industries-these determine the points in 
a nation's position that are susceptible to economic attack. Great 
Britain, for example, was vulnerable to a food shortage; Nazi Ger­
many was vulnerable to a shortage of gasoline. The second basis 
is economic intelligence, or knowledge of these facts. The focus of 
such intelligence must be to determine the shortages that exist in the 
economy at the outbreak of war or that appear during hostilities. 
In order to prosecute economic warfare successfully the ne­
cessity for the collection, collation, and analysis of economic in­
telligence is self-evident. Its importance can hardly be overesti­
mated and it is essential in every phase of this type of operation, 
from the selection of targets for strategic bombing to knowledge of 
shortages in the enemy's territory. 
A great deal, probably a major portion, of the information 
needed for an effective system of economic intelligence can be 
gleaned from published sources. The problem is one of organ­
izing to do the job, especially in peacetime. In the last war there 
was a great deal of overlapping, confusion, and duplication among 
the agencies concerned with this task, and there is no question 
that far too much time elapsed before an effective economic in­
telligence organization was achieved. The inescapable conclusion 
is that much of the job of collecting economic intelligence can and 
should be done prior to the outbreak of hostilities. 
8 
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A very large part though perhaps not all of the necessary 
information that is not available from published sources prob­
ably exists in the files of government · departments and of busi­
ness concerns in this country. The logic of the problem of as­
sembling data for economic warfare requires that any particu­
lar country base its intelligence system on the organizations and 
sources of information at its command. (Traditionally, Great 
Britain has used shipping concerns, banks, foreign trade con­
nections, and its control of the international news orgahizations 
for this purpose, in addition to its diplomatic and consular repre­
sentatives; Germany, as we all know, used German companies or 
plants located abroad, patent interchange agreements, and the 
various kinds of German emigrant societies; Russia clearly uses 
the Communist Party and its fellow travelers for this purpose). 
It is doubtful if any systematic effort has been made to collect and 
collate information in the hands of leading American business 
corporations with far-flung foreign connections, such as the large 
banks, General Motors, Standard of New Jersey, International 
Harvester, and so on. The omission is a matter of great regret, 
since if such information were collected and collated it would 
certainly be very comprehensive. 
The need for this kind of effort appears to be the greater 
since, insofar as I understand thei:;e matters, there is relatively 
little knowledge of the workings of the Russian economy in this 
country, at least as compared with other major powers. This lack 
of an integrated body of data makes offensive economic warfare 
against the Soviet considerably more difficult than would other­
wise be the case. Incidentally, I believe that careful analysis of 
the trade agreements that Russia has concluded since V-J Day, 
and is concluding, both with countries inside and with countries 
outside the Iron Curtain, should be one of the more fruitful 
sources of this kind of knowledge, in that such agreements might 
suggest actual or potential shortages in the Russian economy. 
9 
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We come now to the techniques of economic warfare-block­
ade, export licensing, preclusive buying, control of shipping, black­
lists, blocking of foreign assets, and all the rest. 
Historically, the backbone of economic warfare has been the 
naval blockade in the strict sense of the word. Reliance has been 
placed on the stationing of naval vessels on an enemy coast and out­
side enemy harbors, on patrol of the sea lanes, on observation of ship­
ping in neutral roa:dsteads, and on the careful designation of contra­
band and, when possible, its seizure. During the two World Wars 
this pattern has been altered by three well-defined developments. 
The first was the growth of the navicert system, a system which re­
sultE!d in great economies in the use of warships in supervising neu­
tral shipping .. The second has been the development of the long dis­
tance or paper blockade, which in its more advanced form seeks not 
only to cut off all supplies for the enemy at the point of origin, 
namely, in neutral countries, but even goes so far as to mould the 
economy of neutral territory to your own use. The third circum­
stance has been the breakdown of distinctions between contraband 
and noncontraband goods, whatever the lawyers may say. 
The reasons for these changes are clear. Global warfare and 
conflicts between world-wide alliances, together with the develop­
ment of new weapons such as the airplane and the submarine, have 
greatly increased the need for employing naval vessels in strictly 
naval operations and on convoy duty.. Conversely, the amount of 
naval vessels' time available for blockade purposes has been re­
duced. Furthermore, the larger the land mass and the volume of 
resources controlled by the enemy, the fewer are the objectives that 
can be achieved by a close blockade. The number of strategic items 
in short supply for the Nazis in 1942 was really very small­
petroleum was perhaps the only item in which shortage ever be­
came acute. Moreover, the logics of total war on a global scale 
10 
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make useless any distinctions between contraband and noncontra­
band items. Finally, the necessities of total war require that a 
combatant. not only devote all of his resources to the war effort but 
also, so far as is possible, compel neutral nations to devote their 
resources also to purposes advantageous to him. In pursuit of this 
objective the combatant, of course, makes use of shipping con­
trols, trade agreements, preclusive buying, financial measures, and 
any other procedures available to him·. 
An ancillary purpose sought in the effort to control the 
trade of neutrals is to deprive the enemy of any advantages of trade 
with other countries or the use of any assets that he owns located 
outside his own boundaries. The ultimate goal is to deprive him of 
the benefits that arise from the fact that he is a member of a com­
munity of nations. 
With reference to the navicert system, . it should be pointed 
out that the Navy has three, perhaps four functions to perform un­
der this procedure: the issue of the navicert, although this can per­
haps be done by other agencies; apprehension of blockade runners; 
the enforcement of the rules of blockade at control points; and per­
iodic spot checks of merchant vessels on the high seas to ensure that 
the 
I 
blockade rules are being observed. 
Should a condition of open hostilities develop between· this 
country and the Soviet there can be little doubt that the measures of 
economic warfare existing at the end of World War II would be 
quickly reimposed. The export control measures which, as you 
know, were originally instituted under the Export Control Act of 
July, 1940 as a means of conserving scarce items, would be re­
instituted. They would be reimposed partly for their original pur­
pose of conservation, partly as a means of putting pressure on and 
bargaining with neutral areas or with areas producing resources 
11 
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essential to our own effort, and partly to ensure that no products of 
American fabrication were exported and fell into enemy hands. 
War Trade Agreements, which are essentially a mechanism 
for rationing noncombatant areas and for bringing the operation 
of their economies into conformance with your own needs, would be 
quickly negotiated. The rationing of neutral or noncombatant areas 
has a number of separate aspects, each one of which merits atten­
tion. In the first place, you cannot afford to give these areas all 
they want of many commodities, or even all the shipping space that 
they want. In the last war, the East Coast of South America was 
not only severely rationed as regards its receipts of newsprint and 
steel but also as regards shipping space allocated to it. In the 
second place, it is important that only the essential needs of neutral 
areas be satisfied; otherwise it is entirely possible that scarce items 
may be reexported to the enemy. In the third place, rationing of 
the items that these areas want from you is the best lever for as­
suring that you get the supplies from them that are needed in your 
war program. In the last war it was made very explicit by the 
Belgian Congo that continued shipments of scarce minerals, fats 
and oils and fibers were contingent upon the Congo's receipt of 
manufactured goods and such picturesque items as. old clothes and 
tinware essential for trade with the natives. 
The injury to the Russian war effort that such measures 
might inflict would in general be determined by the extent to 
which the Russian economy and war potential is dependent upon 
imports of raw materials, components, and technical skills from 
abroad. I will not attempt to appraise this matter, since the Rus­
sian war potential is the subject of another lecture in your course. 
I would like to suggest, however, that the effect of these 
measures might be influenced to some extent by another factor, 
namely, the amount of territory controlled by the Russians. The 
12 
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greater the size of the land mass controlled by a military . economy 
the less it tends to be subject to the pressures of economic warfare. 
When Nazi Germany overran Poland, the Balkans, and Norway she 
greatly increased the resources at her command, not the least of 
which was man power. On the other hand, the addition of terri­
tory may lead to greater shortages of certain kinds. For example, 
Holland is a deficit food area, and the fact that the Nazis overran 
the Netherlands must have increased the pressure on their own food 
supplies. One may presume that the use of French industrial ca­
pacity by the Germans increased the pressure on German petrol­
eum resources. The fact that the United States welded Latin 
America to our war economy-insofar as we did-required that we 
supply Latin America with minimum amounts of shipping services, 
newsprint, flour and so forth. As is well known, our efforts to 
service the Caribbean and the East Coast of South America re­
sulted in a number of submarine sinkings that might not other­
wise have taken place and consequently intensified the shortage of 
merchant shipping. In short, if Russia overran Western Europe 
it would increase her war potential, but it would also increase her 
vulnerability to certain types of economic pressure, though prob­
ably not in equal degree. 
If war between the United States and the Soviet should 
break ou:t, the long distance or so-called paper blockade, with its 
three basic instruments, the navicert, the ship's navicert, and the 
ship's warrant, would certainly be imposed immediately. 
As you know, the navicert originated in the First World 
War while the United States was still a neutral. It was originally 
a device for expediting the shipment of noncontraband goods from 
one neutral country to another, a sort of permit for passage through 
the blockade, given at the point of origin. It speedily developed 
into a system of controlling all goods passing in trade between the 
neutral countries. 
18 
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A ship's navicert which was a logical outgrowth of the 
navicert for a particular consignment, was given when all the items 
in a ship's .manifest had been navicerted, and permitted a vessel 
to make a single voyage through naval controls. The ship's navi­
cert provided a description of the ship and its proposed itinerary; 
a list of officers, crew, and passengers; a description of the cargo
? 
ship's stores, mail, and .money; and an account of the source, des­
tination, consignor, and consignee of the cargo. When the appli­
cation for a ship's navicert was received, the crew and passenger 
lists were checked, and 09jectionable persons were removed before 
the issue of the navicert. The effect of the navicert system was that 
all unnavicerted ships and cargo became subject to immediate 
seizure. 
A ship's warrant entitled a vessel to the use of British and 
Allied port facilities-bunkering, ship stores, repairs, and so forth. 
In order to receive a warrant the owner agreed that no vessel 
owned or operated by him would sail to or from the navicert area 
without a ship's navicert, that he would not sell or part with ef­
fective control of any vessel owned by him without the approval of 
the proper authorities, and that he would not employ any enemy 
company for the purpose of obtaining insurance or other facil­
ities. In addition, fleet owners were generally required to charter 
portions of their fleets to the issuing authority; in the last war 
that meant either the British Ministry of War Transport or the War 
Shipping Administration. I have always been under the im­
pression that the presence of Swedish vessels in the Pacific in 
services designated by the British was a result of this kind of lever 
on neutral shipping. 
The extent to which the imposition of shipping controls may 
directly jnjure the Soviets seems to me very problematical. On the 
other hand, the use of these controls would clearly increase the re-
14 
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sources at the command of this country and of 0-reat Britain, and 
it is in this respect that they would be chiefly useful. 
If the cold war should turn into a hot war, it seems certain 
that proclaimed lists of individuals and of business concerns com­
mercially "untouchable" would be speedily developed and that Rus­
sian-owned funds and other assets in territories under our control 
would be sequestered. Here again the direct injury to the Russians 
would be doubtful. Certainly there would be no important body of 
Russian assets owned in t�is country to sequester-nothing like 
the $7,955,000,000 of assets that were blocked in this court try dur­
ing the last war. 
In short, the ocean-borne commerce of Russia, particularly 
that part that could be reached by the navicert system or the pro­
claimed list, seems to be very important to the Soviet. Her land 
bounµaries to the Near East and the Far East would be difficult if 
not impossible to seal through measures of economic warfare. The 
conclusion is, I think, that strategic bombing would be far more 
effective in breaking down the Russian war potential than would 
these other mechanisms. 
By way of conclusion let us consider some of the economic 
aspects of the cold war. These considerations are important on 
their own merits. More importantly, the· degree of success with 
which the United States and the Soviets prosecute their respective 
programs of economic warfare prior to the time hostilities break 
out-if they do-will greatly influence the possibilities of economic 
warfare after the event. 
The general pattern is clear. The Soviets have their policy 
of economic erosion; the United States has the Marshall Plan. 
The chief, the most interesting, and the most baffling charac-
15 
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teristic of the Russian policy is its destructive character. The 
erosion, undermining and· collapse of other economies serves the 
Soviet purpose. Only in minor degree, apparently, are the Russians 
interested in preserving the productive capacity or trade connections 
of territories under their control and in adapting these facilities 
for their own use. In this respect Russian policy largely differs 
from other types of economic penetration that the world has seen. 
On the whole, and notwithstanding some well-known exceptions, 
the British and the Germans have traditionally sought to pre­
serve the economic potential of an area being penetrated, and 
even to build upon it. Their purpose for the most part was to 
turn the productive capacity and facilities in such territories to 
their own use, not to destroy them. 
As I have said, Russian policy is furthered by .the spread 
of economic chaos, by civil disturbance, the diminution of production 
and trade, inflation of currency, dislocation of channels of trade, 
and the disappearance of plants and individual business concerI).s. 
One of my friends points out that the Russians are masters of 
"economic cannibalism," the absorption or destruction. of econ­
omic activity outside Russia, leaving the Russian economy, poor 
as it may be, without a rival. 
In this policy, especially in its early stages, manipulation of 
the monetary and banking· structure is a key element. As we all 
know, inflation of the currency and prostitution of the banking 
syste:r:n in a given a!:ea is the quickest way to check the economic 
processes of production and distribution and to discourage. busi­
nessmen and the spirit of enterprise. The importance of money 
and credit was recognized by Lenin. Both Nazis and Communists 
have used control of money and banking mechanisms as a means 
of breaking down the economies of satellite, peripheral states, and
the position that control of the currency has assumed in the Ber­
lin situation seems to be not wholly accidental. 
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As against this program the United States has as a counter­
measure the Marshall Plan, with all the implications and ramifica­
tions covered by that phrase. It is commonly said that this plan 
is designed for the economic restoration of Europe, but this seems 
to be not a wholly adequate statement. In an immediate sense the 
plan was designed to check economic deterioration in western 
Europe; in a larger sense it is presumably intended to restore an 
economic balance of power in Europe, a sine qua non of the restora­
tion of a military balance of power. 
Certain aspects of the Marshall Plan, however, particularly 
aspects that are significant under economic warfare, I do not think 
are fully appreciated. In what I am about to say I am relying 
chiefly on three very competent documents: A Survey of the 
Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe, United Nations 
Eco.nomic Commission for Europe, Geneva, March 30, 1948; a sup­
plementary document published by the same source, Selected World 
Economic Indices, Lake Success, July, 1948; and The Eighteenth 
Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements, pub-· 
lished at Basie, Switzerland, June 14, 1948. 
It does not seem to be valid to look on the Marshall Plan as 
a means of restoring European industrial production to prewar 
levels. Such a restoration had in fact been substantially achieved 
before the end of 1947. Industrial production of 14 major nations 
of Europe, excluding Germany, in the latter half of that year was 
on the average 99% of prewar production; 8 nations* which in 
1938 accounted for 34 % of European production had exceeded 
prewar output, in some instances by considerable margins. This 
level of production seems to have been achieved in large measure 
because of the increased labor supply in Europe and by a more 
* Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
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complete use of the supply than was the case in 1938, since 
European postwar output per man-hour has been much lower than 
in the prewar period. The conclusion is, I think, that in the field 
of industrial production the logical aim of the Marshall Plan must 
be to raise output above prewar levels. This can take place only 
over a period of time, as capital equipment is increased. Itis also 
probable that an increase in facilities is a necessary condition for a 
rise in the man-hour output to something like its prewar level. 
In the field of trade the picture is very different. In current 
prices, European trade is above the prewar· level, but in terms of 
1938 prices it remains substantially below that of 1939. The Bank 
of International Settlements Report states: "Expressed in real 
value, the trade of European countries with one another in 1947 
represented only 56 % of the prewar volume, while Europe's trade 
- in the non-European countries·amounted to 78% as regards exports
and 106 % as regards imports ______ ,, The relatively high level of im.:.
ports of course fa in good part attributable to American generosity.
The chief area in which thi� "deficiency" in intra-European 
trade appears is in the drop in German trade with Western 
Europe (something like one• billion dollars of trade in each di­
rection having disappeared), and secondarily in the shrinkage of 
trade flowing between western Europe and central and eastern 
European countries. The conclusion appears to be that a major ob­
jective of American policies must be an increased volume of 
European trade. Accomplishment of this goal will in turn be 
largely dependent upon the establishment of sound monetary con­
ditions, balanced budgets, and relaxation of. controls· upon foreign 
exch,ange and international commerce. These. problems of course 
are chiefly domestic problems for the countries concerned. Insofar 
as the· Marshall Plan does not induce or force attainment of these 
conditions it will not realize its potentialities. 
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In some ways the major European problem is the loss to 
Europe, as the result of the war, of "invisible receipts" from 
foreign invesments, shipping, insurance, and so forth. The Bank 
of International Settlements Report states that in the period 1933-
1938, "The net income from Europe's investment in non-European 
countries was equal to about $1.4 milliard ... , .. and accounted for 
about one-quarter of Europe's total imports from non-European 
countries; iri 1947 the corresponding net income would seem to 
have been only $400 million, some 30 percent of what it was be­
fore the war." Here again the conclusion is plain. Unless 
Europe, during the period in which this country supplies aid, so 
reorganizes its economy as to adapt itself to these new conditions 
the Marshall Plan will fall short of its purposes. But this adapta­
tion is again essentially a domestic problem, or perhaps a com­
plex of domestic problems, for European countries. The Marshall 
Plan in and of itself here can do little more than buy time---time for 
the European economy to adjust itself. 
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THE NEAR EAST 
A lecture delivered by 
Professor Hans Kohn 
at the Naval War College 
November 5, 1948 
As y�u know from my lecture on Russia, I am convinced 
that we cannot approach any problem today except by seeing it in 
its historical perspective. It was exactly one hundred fifty years 
.ago that the Near or Middle Eastern question was opened up for 
Western Europe. For we may say that before 1798 the Near and 
Middle East entered the attention of Europe or the Western world 
little, if at all. The Mediterranean, the Middle East, which had 
been the center of world politics and the center of world civiliza­
tion until about 1450 of our era, disappeared entirely from our 
sight after that. It may be said that Columbus went to discover 
America, (which as you know he never intended to do) because 
of the very fact that the Mediterranean had been closed, the Near 
East had been obliterated, and with the Near East the two great 
Asiatic trade. routes, the two trade routes from Europe to the 
Far East, one -leading through Alexandria and the Red Sea, the 
second through Antioch and the Persian Gulf. These two trade 
routes, from antiquity until 1400 had been the most important 
eommercial routes of history, those on which depended the import­
.ance of Italy. Both in antiquity and in the middle ages, the vital­
ity and leadership of Italy, of Rome and later of Venice and Gen­
oa, arid the phenomenon of the Renaissance would have been im­
possible without Italy's geographic strategic position in relation 
to these two trade routes. In the 15th century the victory of the 
Turks closed these· trade · routes to Western mankind. With that 
Professor Kohn is Professor of History at Smith College. His 
lecture on "Russia" appeared in a previous issue of the "Information 
Service." 
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moment began the decay of Italy, the decay of the Mediterranean 
and the rise of the Atlantic powers. 
It was one hundred fifty years ago that the strategic genius 
of Napoleon reopened the Middle East and discovered what is in 
my mind the most important fact in the world situation today, 
namely : that the Middle East is the strategic hub of the Old 
World. Whoever controls the Middle East undoubtedly controls 
the Old World. General Bonaparte who, as you all know, was a 
Mediterranean, born in Corsica, was keenly aware of it. He was 
never a Frenchman by geographic loyalty; his only real loyalty 
belonged to the Mediterranean. He dreamt, as in our own time 
his small imitator Mussolini did, of the resurrection of the Mediter­
ranean empire, not anymore for its own sake but as a key for the 
control of the world. In 1798, Bonaparte had the immensely daring 
conception, a conception similar to that of Alexander the Great, 
to land an expeditionary force in Egypt and to push on from Egypt 
through Syria, Iraq and Iran into India. He was fascinated by 
the idea which, since then, all world conquerors have had, whether 
it was Hitler, Mussolini or Stalin, to destroy the British Empire 
as the only bulwark standing between, on the one hand, the aspira­
tion to world domination, and on the other hand, the world of 
liberty. He wished to deal the British Empire a deadly blow by 
going across the ancient land route to India. You know he pushed on 
from Egypt to Palestine and Haifa, as we call it today, and it was 
only because of the pestilence in camp and because of certain news 
coming from France that he had to call off his venture and return 
to France. From this moment two things remained. . One is what 
I would call "the regeneration of Islam." Napoleon's administration 
in Egypt, though very short-lived, left deep traces. There was a 
man of energy, ruthlessness, strength. His name was Mohamed 
Ali, a simple soldier in the Turkish Army, an Albanian by birth. 
By his intelligence, and by his unscrupulous .ruthlessness he made 
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himself governor or pasha of Egypt, then a Turkish province. As 
pasha he learned enough fr<?m French influence to wish to modernize
Egypt, to create a modern army, even to begin a modern navy, to 
introduce modern economy. Islam was awakened from hundreds 
of years of lethargy, apathy and sleep. The present king of Egypt, 
Farouk is a descendant of the Mohamed Ali whom I have just 
mentioned. 
But the second, and more important consideration for us is 
that Napoleon drew attention to the long forgotten trade routes 
and the strategic position of the Middle East and drew the at­
tention of the British there, and from that moment on it has been 
British policy to make sure that the Middle East does not fall 
into the hands of any great military power and that the Middle 
East will be kept open. From 1798 until today, all British foreign 
policy and all British strategy has been dominated by the one con­
viction not to allow any great military power to establish itself in 
the Middle East. Today we have inherited the British task both 
politically and strategically. It is, in my opinion, our foremost 
consideration not to allow any great military power to claim ex­
clusive control of the Middle East, because whoever holds. the Mid­
dle East, holds Africa,.Asia and Europe. This has been shown very 
clearly in the two wars which have been fought, since Napoleon, 
for world control. 
The two wars fought for world control, World War I, and 
World War II, both had one of the decisive battlefields in the Near 
c.: East. It was much less noticed in the United States, yet in World 
War I the Germans made a very determined effort, with the 
help of the Turks, to capture the Suez Canal and to drive the 
British out of the Middle East. At that time the attempt was 
made from the east, with the help of Turkey, to the Suez Canal. 
The British defeated the attempt and, in a counter-attack, oc­
cupied Jerusalem and later drove up to Syria. There is one im-
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portant point in this struggle in World War I against Germany 
and Turkey: the British tried to enlist the cooperation of the Arabs. 
The Turks were then the enemies of Britain and allied with Ger­
many. The only people who could be organized against the Turks 
were the Arabs. The Arabs were the first great force in Islam, 
the first great conquering race of the Mohammedan religion. They 
had been obscured and dominated by the Turks, and the British 
now tried to reawaken their national pride, the memory of the 
centuries of Arab greatness. They were quite successfully sup­
ported in that indirectly by Americans since the most important 
educational institutions in the Arab world were the American insti­
tutions, especially the American University of Beirut in Lebanon, 
the greatest educational institution in the Near East. The Ameri­
can missionaries there tried to arouse an Arab awakening which 
had no connection with that provoked by the British. The Ameri­
can one had been more on the intellectual side, educational ; the 
British one more on the· military, political side. The British ap­
pealed above all to the Arab ruler, to the Arab sheik in Mecca, in 
the capital of Islam, in the foremost city of Mohammedan 
tradition, where a descendant of Mohammed himself, by the name 
of Hussein Ibn Ali was then the leading member of the aristocracy, 
or as the Arabs called it, the Sharif of Mecca. His son is Ab­
dullah, King of Trans-Jordan at present, and from that fact we 
can understand both the long lasting British ties with Ab­
dullah of Trans-Jordan and Abdullah's ambition to play .a great 
role in the Arabic or Mohammedan world-for Abdullah is the 
only surviving son of Hussein of Mecca. It was a romantic Eng­
lishman, one of the strange figures with which the otherwise gen­
erally "dull" British stock is quite rich, this rather strange exotic 
figure, T. E. Lawrence, who went out to Arabia and started what 
he descri.bed as the "revolt in the desert."• The British suc­
ceeded, with the help of·the Arabs in defeating the Turks and the 
German attempt to dominate the Middle East. 
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In World War II the Middle East was again a decisive 
battlefield. You gentlemen will remember as much as I do the 
fateful month of June 1940 when the German armies had 
triumphed all over Europe; when Hitler and Stalin were close 
friends and allies, when France lay crushed and when Italy had 
joined the war on the side of Germany to be in for the kill of 
the French and British empires; when Marshal Petain, certain­
ly a soldier of some knowledge, expected that within three weeks 
- Britain would fall. At that moment the question was for me, who
knew the Middle East very well, not what would happen in the
British Isles but what would happen in the Middle East, because
if the Hitler-Mussolini combination had taken. hold of the Middle
East, . then there was no doubt with me that Asia. was lost to Hit-.
ler and the Japanese. Lost, I am entirely convinced, irrevoc;ably for
any foreseeable future. At that moment Mussolini entered the war,
and at that time we did not know, though some of us suspected,
u that the famous Fascist army, navy, and air force did not exist
really. We all were impressed by Mussolini. You remember his
picture in the papers then, with open mouth, his jaw forward, de­
claring that "In the next war, Italian bayonets will decide the
war and Italian airplanes will blacken the skies." It was in 1938
that he declared that to the Italian senate. You may remember
that the air force impressed us when Balbo flew over with his
fliers to Chicago, so much so that I think even today an' avenue
in Chicago is called A venue Balbo. In any case, it impressed us
tremendously. And now in June 1940 the British had 30,000
men along the Suez canal with about 500 second rate planes. The
30,000 men were mostly imperial colonial troops, Australians, with
some Negroes from Africa, and others. Mussolini had 150,000
men of the best soldiers in Eritrea and the same number under
the Duke of Aosta in Ethiopia. I was afraid then that the su­
perior Italian air force and the two armies; could move in a pin-
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cer movement on Egypt and the Suez canal, liquidate thE:! British 
situation there, and establish an impregnable situation for the 
Axis from Morrocco to China. If that had happened, our land­
ing in Africa would not have succeeded. 
It was because of the unique luck and the courage of the 
British that the Italians, and later Rommel, were defeated. I am en­
tirely convinced that, should a next war come, and I have good 
reasons to believe that it will not come if the West be­
comes really united and prepared, that the decisive spot will 
again be the Middle East. That is the reason why we must make 
sure, and are making sure I think successfully, that the Middle 
East does not fall into Russian hands. The Russians have tried 
to gain control of the Middle East since the days of Catherine 
the II, who conquered the Crimea, the North Shore of the Black 
Sea. Catherine hated her son, the future Czar Paul, but loved 
her grandchildren. She selected their names, not Paul, and she 
named her oldest grandchild Alexander, in memory of Alexander 
the Great who conquered Asia, and named her second son Con­
stantine in memory of Constantine the First, who established Con­
stantinople, Byzantium, as the seat of the world empire. From 
the days of Catherine II to the days of Stalin, the Middle East has 
been the prime ambition of the Russians. The British never tried 
to occupy or rule the Middle East. Primarily they wished to ex­
clude Russia and Napoleon and the Germans. Our policy is the 
same. We are int�rested in excluding Russia, and so far we have 
done well. I can assure you from a close knowledge of the Middle 
East, where I lived for eight years, and from a study of the 
situation in the Middle East, that we have succeeded beyond any­
body's expectations, with relatively small cost so far, in averting 
an imminent threat to the Middle East which two years ago seemed 
unavertable. 
If we could achieve in China what we have done in the 
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Middle East, I think we could begin to feel much more secure 
than we do now. 
Two years ago Greece was threatened from Albania, Yugo­
slavia and Bulgaria. Greece is important for us because the Greeks 
are the only sea-faring people in the Near and Middle East. Neither 
the Russians nor the Turks nor the Arabs nor the Persians are a 
sea-faring people. The Greeks are, by their history and by the_ir 
whole geography. Their islands are strategic islands and Greece 
is destined to be the key to further Russian penetration. East of 
Greece is Turkey and two years ago the Russians put forward 
strong demands for a large part of Eastern Anatolia. There is a 
claim, which is not unfounded, that centuries ago Armenians lived 
there. But you can't turn the wheel of history back centuries, 
though many nationalists are trying it. Three Soviet professors 
proved to their own satisfaction: and that of 'Mr. Stalin that 
northern Turkey, on the shore of the Black Sea, had once been 
Georgian territory that should be annexed to Soviet Georgia. 
Turkey would thus lose all Kurdistan, these commanding heights 
from which the road to the Persian Gulf lies open. Secondly the 
Russians claimed then the right to put their bases into the Dar­
danelles, which would have practically meant domination of 
Istanbul or Constantinople and of Turkey. The third important 
thing is that, two years ago a Soviet puppet government, backed 
by Soviet troops, was established in Iran, in Azerbaijan. This 
government was a threat to Turkey and to the Persian Gulf. That 
was the situation two years ago, and everybody was convinced that 
if Russian armed columns break through to the Persian Gulf, that 
means to our oil fields there, nothing could stop them. 
Now two years have gone by. There is no actual threat 
whatsoever at present to Greece or Turkey or to Iran. The Soviet 
government in Azerbaijan has been liquidated. All Russian troops 
are out of Iran. No new demands for Turkish territory are voiced 
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although the situation in Greece is rotten and will remain rotten, 
for the very simple reason that the Greek nation has never yet 
learned to work together without being at the brink of a civil 
war. In spite of that, no Russian or Yugoslav or Bulgarian soldier 
has transgressed into Greece; on the other hand the front of Stalin 
on the frontiers of Greece has been broken. Yugoslavia is to­
day no longer an entirely dependable satellite of Russia, an aston­
ishing change. Two years ago Greece was Russia's; today Stalin 
cannot be very certain of Tito's Yugoslavia. So I would say that, 
so far as I can see, the situation in the Middle East, with rather 
little expenditure, has been immensely strengthened. 
That is important, not only for strategic reasons, but also 
for the oil. You all know about the British oil which exists in 
southwestern Persia. The concession in northern Iraq is one half 
British, one fourth American and one fourth French. By far the 
most important concession of all, those in Saudi Arabia, are en­
tirely American. This oil is needed for three purposes. One is 
for the economic recovery of Europe under the Marshall plan. We 
can't send oil from the U. S. The Europeans have no oil; theirs 
comes from the Middle East. The Russians don't wish Europe to 
recover. They would like to cut up the Middle Eastern oil. Second, 
the British navy depends upon the Middle Eastern oil and the Brit­
ish navy is as much our interest as our navy is. And third, even 
our navy depends on Middle Eastern oil. 
Now some people here in the United States tell you "Why 
should we worry about the profits of the Standard Oil Com­
pany?" I must tell you that they are right. We should not worry 
about the profits of the Standard Oil Company. But the whole 
question thus put, is pure demagogy. We need the oil from the 
Middle East, irrespective of any profit or not, for our strategic 
survival. If people come and tell you that the State Department 
is following a certain policy in the Middle East because it is 
28 
31
Naval War College: February 1949 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
subservient to the oil interests, that is the barest nonsense! We 
must hold the Middle East for our survival-strategically, and be­
cause we·need the oil, not for the profits for the Standard Oil Com­
pany. Our vital national interests are involved there. 
That is one point, and the second point is that we cannot 
hold these regions without close cooperation with the native peoples. 
That is what the British learned. The British did not know it fifty 
years ago; the British . learned that they cannot rely on India or 
Pakistan, on Arabia or Turkey, without the sympathy and coopera­
tion of the native populations; These native populations, the Turk, 
Arab, Iranian or Persian, are today in a state of national awaken­
ing, of the awakening of political consciousness, in a feeling of im­
mense pride which can be very easily hurt. They are not like the 
British or-ourselves, so secure that they would riot mind pin-pricks 
or anything like that. They are immensely jealous of their national 
position. And I am entirely convinced that we cannot hold these 
regions without the sympathy of the native populations on our side. 
The British enlisted the sympathy of the Arabs in World War II, 
especially of the two most important · Arab rulers. One was Ibn 
Saud, the king of Saudi Arabia, a very strong personality, a man 
of unusual power as you probably know. King Ibn Saud is a man 
of about sbtty-eight just now. King Ibn Saud began his life as a 
small sheikh. He was a small potentate leading fanatical Mo­
hammedans called the Wahhabis. It was through their fanaticism 
and his genius of leadership that he conquered the whole of 
Arabia. For the first time sin�e Mohammed, he .united the whole 
of Arabia and brought peace and order there. Ibn Saud is un­
doubtedly a person of unusual strength, a commanding personal­
ity, who created in the desert, in the immense poverty of the nomad­
ic tribes what was, for the first time, a progressive orderly govern­
ment. The second man is King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, the only 
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surviving son of Hussein of Mecca. The British understood that 
they had to enlist the friendship of these two . men, and it was 
due to their friendship that in World War II, in the most tragic 
situation in the Middle East, the Arabs did not cut the British com­
munications. Though the Arab could have never waged open war, 
they could have been very damaging if they wanted to, but they 
stood loyally with Britain. Britain cannot forget that. Britain 
knows that her security and by her security, our security, depends 
on establishing friendship with the Arabs and with the Turks. 
And now in the last few words I wish to talk about the 
Turks because there is nothing more astonishirtg and nothing more 
indicative of the future of the Middle East than the transforma­
tion of Turkey. Some of you may have been to Turkey before 
World War I. Some American ships sailing there remember the 
entirely oriental, backward, medieval country then ruled by a Sul­
tan, a ruler who was at the same time the spiritual head of the 
state. Turkey was entirely ruled by Mohammedan medieval law. 
The women had, to go veiled; polygamy existed ; there was no 
modern social life whatsoever. After World War I, Turkey under 
a great military leader Mustafa Kemal (or as he was called later 
Kemal Ataturk) drove out the invading Greeks, and for the first 
time in one hundred fifty years Turkey became entirely )nde­
pendent from the . intrigues and controls . of foreign powers. Mus­
tafa Kemal now began what I regard as the most successful pro-, 
cess of modernization done anywhere in Asia. Much more suc­
cessful than not only the other Asiatic peoples but also than 
the Communists, because Mustafa Kemal did it without any super­
ffous cruelty, without barbarizing the land. He tried to establish 
there something like a modern European nation and he has suc­
ceeded to an astonishing degree; Greece today is torn by internal 
dissension, Greece is not a nation. Persia is a backward country, 
certainly not a nation, and the Russians could cut through Persia 
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like a knife cuts through butter. Turkey is different; Turkey is an 
organic, integrated nation since Mustafa Kemal. It would be a 
tremendous task for the Russians to conquer Turkey, and they 
know it very well. The "secularization" of Turkey took her away 
from her ancient Mohammedan medieval order to be modernized 
and to be equipped as a modern nation. Think only of the position 
of the women; there is no polygamy in Turkey anymore. In 
Turkey today modern European law absolutely prevails. Women 
are no longer veiled; women can participate fully in all social and 
political life, a tremendous change in a few years time. I am 
convinced that in that direction all the Middle Eastern people will 
go. It will take much longer with the Arabs, or with the Persians. 
The Arabs are today disunited; still not a modern nation like the 
Turks but they are on the way to it and it is· immensely im­
portant, as the British have understood, to help this develop­
ment forward instead of trying to hinder it. 
I am optimistic about the Middle East. Our position in the 
Middle East, or the British one, which is for all practical pur­
poses one and the same, is strategically sound and can be and 
will be, in my opinion, politically sound, because we need the Mid­
dle East and ultimately the Middle East needs us, needs us not 
only for protection against Russia. The Middle East cannot en­
ter by its own strength upon a sound policy of economic and 
social modernization-only American and British capital and 
American and British educational and technical help can provide 
the means. One hundred fifty years ago the Middle East was 
opened up. Since then it has formed a bridge between Europe, 
Asia and Africa. I'm convinced it is a strong bridge, one which 
can easily become a very important factor in the defense system of 
Western civilization and world peace. 
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THE HERITAGE OF TYRE 
A lecture delivered by 
Rear Admiral Charles R. Brown, U. S. N. 
at the Naval War College 
December 17, 1948 
Since man first sat astride a floating log and propelled 
himself with a piece of driftwood, the waterways have served 
not only as frontiers but as areas of conflict and avenues of in­
tercourse between peoples. It is, for instance, the ocean routes and 
not the impassable land barriers between them which truly .join 
North and South America. The same was true in the old world. 
The Mediterranean, though separating three continents, was the 
chief means of contact, conflict and the spread of the civilization 
which grew up along its shores. Here trade, piracy, and organ­
ized sea warfare seemed to have flourished from pre-historic times. 
The first great seafaring people were apparently the 
Cretans or Minoans, but Phoenicia with her great port of Tyre was 
the first maritime nation of which we know the history. Phoeni­
cian ships more than 12 centuries before Christ were receiving 
the wealth of the East, and distributing it along the shores of the 
Mediterranean. It is hard to overstress the importance of these 
early mariners as builders of civilization. The venturesome ex­
plorer who brought his ship into some uncharted port not only 
opened up a new source of wealth for himself but also quickened 
civilization at both ends of his route. The cargo ships that left 
the Nile Delta distributed the arts of Egypt as well as her wheat. 
Greece, was the next nation after Phoenicia to become a 
sea power, and her great victory over Xerxes navy at Salamis was 
Admiral Brown is Chief of Staff to the President, Naval War Col­
lege. During the war he served as Chief of Staff to Commander 
Carrier Division One, and commanded the Kalinin Bay and the 
Hornet. 
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what really ended the menace of Persia on European soil. Upon 
its issue depended the Golden Age of Athens which reached its 
flower in the 80 years following, and which could hardly have come 
had Greece fallen under the demoralizing influence of oriental 
rule. Salamis was therefore a victory not only for Greece but for 
all of mankind. 
Two centuries elapsed between the Greek victory at Salamis 
and the Punic Wars, a second great struggle between alien races 
for Mediterranean control. Here again it can be said that the wel: 
fare of mankind rode with victory in that struggle. Compared 
with the culture of Rome, with its law, engineering and ideals of 
practical efficiency, the civilization of Carthage was barren and 
sterile. 
Carthage, herself a Phoenician colony, had centuries of ex­
perience in seafaring and sea fighting while Rome was predomi­
nantly a land power. But Rome was young, lean and hard while 
Carthage was old, and ripe for plucking. So Rome took to the sea 
and, after a long struggle, destroyed Carthaginian sea power. 
Thus was Rome forced reluctantly upon the sea. Rome 
then, in turn, became dominant on every Mediterranean shore and, 
through sea power she gained the world. For the next six cen­
turies the Mediterranean was to remain for the Romans mare
nostrum ( our sea) • 
In the year 328 A. D., the Emperor Constantine the Great 
shifted his capitol from Rome to Byzantium now known as Is­
tanbul but best known to us as Constantinople. It is a strange 
commentary upon the indifference of us of the western world that 
we could owe an incalculable debt to the eastern Roman Empire and 
yet rem,ain so ignorant on the subject. While Rome fell apart and
Europe broke up in chaos and descended into the Dark Ages, a single 
citadel of western culture stood fast at Constantinople, a preserver 
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of Christianity and the cultural heritage of Greece and Rome, as 
well as a civilizing influence upon slavic people to the northward. 
For a period of over 700 years, a time longer than from her final 
fall in 1453 until today, Byzantium alone stayed the westward 
sweep of Mohammedanism under first the Saracen and then the 
Turk until the weak states of Europe could grow strong enough 
to finally halt the sons of the prophet at the gates of Vienna. 
Again, it is a story of the East against the West, of the struggle 
of alien peoples for the Mediterranean. And it is a story of sea 
power. 
During her 1000 years of life, Byzantium stood firm only as 
long as she kept hold on the sea. Each time she failed to do this 
her strength dwindled until at last she had shrunk to a mere city 
fortress the doom of which was assured long before it fell. The 
Turks finally took Constantinople after a brief siege of seven 
weeks. 
The resulting Turkish supremacy in the Mediterranean was 
the direct cause of the great voyages of discovery. Blocked by 
the Turks fro.m the old caravan trade routes to China, the West 
turned toward the open sea to seek Cathay west across the At­
lantic· and south around Africa. 
The rise of Portugal was a spectacular phenomenon of the 
Age of Discovery. Her intrepid navigators rounded Africa to 
open a sea. route to the Indies and made Portugal the richest na-
,, tion in Europe, with a great colonial empire and claims to dominion 
over half the seas of the world. But the Portuguese system of 
colonial administration or rather exploitation, was even worse than 
Spain's and. Portugal fell back into the ranks of lesser states. 
The rise and fall of Spain is a tragic parallel of Portugal's. 
As Portugal first turned south and east, Spain was to go westward 
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to Mexico and Peru to carry her pillage and her conquest. From 
the ancient Aztec and Inca empires Spain was to wring the gold 
and silver with which to finance the next centuries of wars, wars 
whose outcomes were to give racial, religious, and political form 
to the world in which we live. But Spain, too, was to fail due to 
many causes which may be roughly summed up as a lack of mari­
time genius. 
Next it was Holland whose turn it was to flash dramatically 
across the pages of history. Her rise to wealth and power was a 
tribute to Dutch character, integrity, hard-headed business sense 
and native maritime genius, for it was the sea alone which gave 
Holland an avenue to greatness. Her fall came after she had spent 
herself against the maritime strength of England. 
France too was to make her bid for sea -power and French 
naval history is a story of promise· alternating with· disappoint­
ment. The French navy has known periods of great glory and, in its 
lowest estate, never dishonored the military reputation so dear to • 
that nation. Yet as a maritime nation, France has never held more 
than a respectable position. 
Some peculiar quirk of national character seemed to color the 
naval strategy of France. Her officers sought to economize their 
fleet, to use it in commerce warfare rather than in battle. Even 
when fortune favored France, she lost golden opportunities due 
to this fatal weakness which corrupted her officers. The English 
officer, on the contrary, sought out the enemy and took the of­
f e:nsive, retrieving many a blunder in strategy and tactics by sheer 
hard hitting. 
This brings us to England where we will pick up the threads 
of our story and tie them together, for the true story of modern 
sea power until aft�r the turn of this the 20th century has been 
the history of England. While others rose to shine but briefly 
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though often brilliantly, she was to climb steadily until she be­
came the acknowledged mistress of the seas. This control of the 
sea exercised by England was not the gift of fortune. It was a 
prize gained, in the main, by wise policy in peace and hard fight­
ing in war. 
England first defeated the Spanish Navy, and then it was 
Holland who must meet the challenge of the British Isles. There 
followed three great wars in which the Dutch fought with epic 
gallantry. But in the Third Dutch War France teamed up with 
England, and Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Faced on 
the land by France, the dominating military power, and on the sea 
by the combined might of the British and French navies, all 
seemed lost. And yet Holland was not defeated. She opened 
her dikes to check the armies of invasion and, under her great 
Admiral deRyder, fought the navies of France and England to a 
standstill. When peace eventually came all honors were hers but 
she was an exhausted and prostrate land, and Holland, like Spain, 
settled back in slow decline. 
This enmity of the French king for the Dutch which led him 
to team up with the English had gained nothing for France and 
everything for England. Unwittingly Louis XIV had built up the 
only country that could become the greatest colonial and maritime 
rival of France. A series of wars were now to blaze forth be­
tween England and France with such frequency that the two na­
tions were to remain at daggers' points for the next century and 
a quarter. 
Time permits only the barest mention of a few of these 
wars, important though they be. In the Seven Years' War, the 
British Fleet was to prove a priceless weapon. Teamed up with 
Wolfe, that 18th century master of amphibious warfare, it was 
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to wreck the French colonial Elmpire. The Seven Years' War 
finally ended in terms of deepest humiliation to France. She was 
compelled to renounce to England all of Canada ,the Ohio Valley and 
the entire area east of the Mississippi, except the then sickly 
little settlement at New Orleans. 
No peace such as., that following the Seven Years' Wars 
could be permanent. Every patriotic Frenchman burned with a 
passion for revenge. The · opportunity came with the American 
Revolution. From the outset France was unneutral and, after the 
capture of Burgoyne, she decided to enter the war openly. It may 
seem startingly to say, but the Revolutionary War was as much 
naval as it was military. Before the entry of France, the English 
kept their army supplied by sea and forced Washington into the 
cruel depths of Valley Forge. George Washington, himself, ac­
knowledged it was the French Navy that really saved America. 
And the final victory, which was assured when Cornwallis sur­
rendered at Yorktown, came from a temporary loss of control of 
Cornwallis' sea communications. 
Ten years after the American Revolution British sea power 
was drawn into a more prolonged and desperate conflict with 
France following· the French Revolution. As the war dragged on, 
Spain and Holland were to add their navies to that of France and 
the rise of Bonaparte was to make France supreme on the Con­
tinent. But the magnitude of these events on land during · which 
Napoleon fought a hundred bloody campaigns, overthrew king., 
doms, and remade the map of Europe, obscures the prime im­
portance of the warfare that went on the sea. For it was Great 
Britain by virtue of her navy and insular position that remained 
Napoleon's least vulnerable and most obstinate opponent, forc­
ing him to ever renewed and exhausting campaigns, reviving con­
tinental opposition and supporting it with subsidies made possi­
ble by control of sea trade. 
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Finally, at Trafalgar, the English won a signal victory 
against a much larger French fleet in what is universally ac­
counted one of the decisive battles of the world. Napoleon who 
had been planning an invasion of England faced his army back 
towards the Continent saying: "It will be Britain that forces us 
to conquer Europe." The great conqueror had set his feet .on 
the path leading to Moscow and Waterloo. 
It was in that same June of 1812 when Napoleon gath­
ered his "army of twenty nations" for the Russian Campaign 
that the United States declared war on Great Britain. The tiny 
American Navy fought brilliantly but was inevitably smothered 
by weight of numbers and the final peace settled none of the dif­
ferences that had begun the war. 
The remainder of the 19th century was to be a period of 
relative peace thanks to the British naval predominance which 
had broken the Napoleonic hegemony, stripped France of practi­
cally all of her American possessions· and made . America north of 
the Rio Grande English in speech, laws and traditions. The Union 
blockade crippled the finances of the South, shut out munitions and 
food stuffs, and was a major factor in the downfall of the Con­
federacy. The Japanese defeat of the Chinese Navy in the Bat­
tle of the Yalu in 1894, marked the emergence of Japan as a formid:­
able force in international affairs and brought in a period of in­
tensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far East. And 
finally in 1898, the last sorry act was played out in dying Spanish 
sea power. Spain was ignominously defeated in both the Battles 
of Manila Bay and Santiago. 
In 1904 the Russo-Japanese War broke out in best Japan­
ese tradition by a vicious attack without declaration of war. This 
war was marked by two great Japanese naval victories; the first 
off Port Arthur on August 10, 1904 and the second in Tsushima 
Straits on the 27th of May, 1905. 
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The Russo-Japanese War greatly weakened Russia's posi­
tion in Europe, leaving the dual alliance of France and Russia out­
weighed by that of Germany and Austria. This upsetting of the 
European balance of power coupled with Germany's commercial 
rivalry and the growing might of the German navy forced Eng­
land to abandon her neutral position in between and the First 
World War was to find her on the side of France and Russia. 
World War I was fundamentally akin to the Napoleonic 
Wars, a struggle between land power predominant on the Contin­
ent and naval power supreme on the seas. The English blockade 
was soon to make its strangling power felt. As had the French 
before them, the Germans retaliated with commerce raiding. But 
unlike France, Germany had the submarine, which was soon to 
prove one of the greatest perils of the sea. Its effective­
ness was to be deeply underscored by the almost complete Eng­
lish dependency upon the sea. The battle against the submarine 
was finally won but the margin was dangerously close. 
We need not concern ourselves too closely with the various 
naval actions of the First World War. The English fleet was to 
keep the sea while the German fleet found it impossible to break 
out through the steel ring of Britain. However, we should briefly 
review the one great naval battle of the war which was fought at 
Jutland. Here England won at least a strategic victory but failed to 
destroy the German fleet. Had England won an epic victory, Jut­
land would have marked the turning point of the war instead of 
leading, in Churchill's own words, "Directly to the submarine peril 
of 1917." The German submarine campaign could never have at­
tained the effectiveness it did. But most important of all, Russia 
could have been kept in the war. For, paradoxically, the first 
victim" of sea power in World War I was not Germany, but Eng-
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land's ally Russia who succumbed to the German Navy. Ninety 
percent of Russia's imports were cut off by the combined efforts 
of the German navy, which blockaded the Baltic, and Germany's 
Turkish ally who held the Dardanelles. Russia suffered terrible 
losses from the resulting lack of munitions, and this desperate plight 
of Russia was the most compelling reason for the British Dardan­
elles' Campaign. Unfortunately, however;· the Campaign was a 
tragic failure, and Russia fell' into ruins. , 
So much for the First World War. The. Second World War, 
with some justification, has been called a continuation of that First 
World War which had .been interrupted by .a period of armed truc,e. 
Certainly the twenty-five years which began in 1914, have the 
qualities of a great .tragedy. The League of Nations proved to 
be an unhappy failure and the world was to watch .the clouds of 
war grow ever more ominous. France by her unwillingness to 
make timely concessions to a moderate German government hasten­
ed that government's fall which brough. t .into power the ele­
ments of extreme dissatisfaction. EnglB.Ild, disturbed. by French, 
predominance, which overthrew . the balance of, power, was not 
. • . .  , ,, 
altogether unsympathetic towards a resurgent Germany. Am�ri-
ca resolutely .turned .her back on the wprld, d�termined to regain 
her historic isolation. Germany, far from penitent, wished only 
to correct mistakes which had somehow robbed her superior war 
machine of the fruits of victory and. hoped yet to wrench rich 
spoils from decadent :neighbors. Japan: the most recent and most 
irresponsible recruit to Imperialism, was determined to follow her 
destiny towards a dream of world domination; while Italy, steeped 
in nostalgic dreams of an ancient glory, skulked like a greedy 
jackal in the trail of the jungle giants. 
By 1933 it was evident that the three nations, Japan, Italy 
and Germany, were set upon paths leading inevitably and fatally 
to war. Thereafter, events were to transpire with increasing fre-
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quericy which were to carry the whole world into another mortal 
conflict. It was now too plain that the forces of aggression could 
only be stopped by force, but out of an anarchy of compromise, a 
policy of appeasement had been born and Germany's opponents 
were to absorb even ruder shocks before their deep-rooted anti-war 
sentiments could be overcome. Finally in 1938, the world saw 
the supreme humiliation of England at Munich, and when on 
September 1st, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, England and 
France, pushed beyond all limits, declared war two days later. The 
Second World War had begun. Or had it begun in 1937 with the 
Japanese invasion of China; or earlier still, in 1931, when Japan 
invaded Manchuria? Indeed, had the troubled peace-begun by the 
Armistice and unsolved by the vengeful treaty of Versailles­
been other than an armed truce while nations realined and re­
armed to continue the struggle to see which one could claw its 
way to the top? 
In the beginning German victories on the Continent came 
with such clock-like regularity that, in less than a year, Poland, 
Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France had been over­
run. On the 22nd of June, 1940, France signed an humiliating 
armistice which was to reduce her to virtual slavery throughout 
the remainder of the war. 
But across the Channel the British people seemed to sud­
denly discover a new reservoir of power and confidence. The 
Chamberlain government fell and behind the courageous and dy­
namic leadership of Winston Churchill, the English rallied to show 
a deathless courage,· a stamina and fortitude worthy · of English­
men of any other age. An outnumbered Royal Air Force fought 
back the horde of German aircraft which, with increasing in­
tensity throughout the summer, sought to drive it from the skies 
as a prelude to invasion. 
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Finally, defeated in the air over Britain, Germany was to 
again turn to the Continent and the Balkan states were overrun 
or forced into vassalage. Then on June the 22nd, 1941, Hitler, 
like Napoleon before him, was to begin his fateful Russian ad­
venture. For a while the German army swept all before it and, 
in October and November, victory seemed imminent. Japan de­
cided that time was ripe fot her complete entrance into a struggle 
bidding fair to recarve the world into totalitarian empires and on 
December 7, 1941, began war without warning by an air raid 
against the American Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. 
What of sea power during this titanic struggle of land and 
air warfare, which, in a little over two years, had swept across 
the face of the earth? 
This time a wiser Germany was able to soften the effects of 
blockade by stockpiling, the development of synthetics, and through 
conquest, the acquirement . of the stockpiles of neighboring states 
and the incorporation into her economy of vast areas with their 
sources of raw materials. Thus the negative effect of sea power's 
denial of commerce was, temporarily at least, defeated; but Eng­
land and her Allies were to continue to enjoy the positive boon 
of huge imports throughout the duration of the war. 
Germany, recognizing England's complete dependence on 
the sea, was to bend every effort to accomplish what she had failed 
to do before-sever the British lifeline. - The struggle was to be a 
seesaw with the submarine finally going down in defeat, but again 
the margin was dangerously close. 
Later as America found her strength the sea was to supply a 
crushing bomber off erisive and make possible a series of amphibious 
operations which finally liberated• Europe and--·destroyed the Ger­
man army. It was sea power which won at El Alamein and in the 
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later North African invasion. It was the same story in Sicily and 
in Italy when the foes of Germany were to return to the Continent 
at last. And, again, it was the long arm of sea power that, in the 
early dawn of June the 6th, 1944, supported the invasion of France 
which was to set the final seal of bankruptcy on German strategy. 
But it was in the Pacific that sea power more than ever was 
to prove the handmaiden of victory. Fought across the largest 
body of water in the world, an ocean only sparsely dotted with small 
islands, the war in the Pacific was obviously from the start a naval 
war., For no other reason, Japan's first and choice objective was 
the American fleet. 
You know the rest of the story as well as I. Japan received 
her first check in the Coral Sea when a seaborne invasion aimed at 
the capture of Port Moresby was forced to turn back. Then came 
Midway. Many informed Japanese saw in Midway the turning 
point of the war, and so calamitous were the results considered, 
that the story was never announced in the homeland until after 
final surrender. 
Many famous battles were fought and many epic and gallant 
deeds were done which have added rich pages to our history. I wish 
I had the time to discuss them. But I must rest content by say­
ing that the United States succeeded in welding land, sea and air 
forces into an amphibious machine which moved amphibiously 
across the most forbidding distances in the world and succeeded 
in severing Japan from her sources of supply and provided the 
bases and the logistic support required by the Air Force in its 
great bomber offensive against Japan. 
And so to sum up this little thumb nail sketch which covers 
all of written history, we find that the prime importance of sea 
power is clearly demonstrable from the days of Tyre until today. 
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Sea power denies the enemy the sinews of war and provides them 
for one's- self. Sea power permits us to carry war to the enemy 
thus forcing him to fight at home where it hurts. This will also 
ease our own defense requirements, for the enemy will 
have to expend precious resources in defense that he might other­
wise use in attacking us. Worse than that (from his point of view), 
he will grow to live in constant dread of our landings and will have 
to spread his forces so thin in order to protect himself in all di­
rections that no matter how big his army and air force, he will 
find they are never big enough. For the choice of the point of at­
tack is always given to that nation which controls the sea. 
"But why seize and build these bases?" I am asked. "Cannot 
our airplanes fly there, bomb the enemy, and then get back?" 
No, they cannot; that is, none we have built yet can do it. Nor 
do our scientists hold out any promise of airplanes that can do so 
at any time soon. Of course we can refuel them in the air, but that 
is an expensive way to do it. Besides fighters cannotgo along to 
protect the bombers, and bombers must have their fighter cover. 
But, even if we had super long-range bombers and fighters, 
there is another compelling reason why we must have our bomber 
bases close to the enemy. If we cut the distance a bomber must fly 
in half, we multiply its effectiveness by four. If we cut the dis­
tance down to one-fourth, we will multiply its effectiveness by 
sixteen. 
This old law of mathematics applies to all weapons, includ­
ing the guided missile. The day of the long range guided missile 
is still many years -in the future but when it comes, navies will 
still be needed to take it closer to the enemy so that we can enjoy 
this enormous advantage of multiplying its effectiveness by many, 
many fold. 
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But what about the atomic bomb? Hasn't this changed the 
whole complexion of war? 
Of course it has. I would be the last to deprecate the terrible 
potentialities of this weapon which can only be described in words 
of horror. But nothing has changed our fundamental laws. The 
way to win a war is still the same and will continue to be the same. 
To be victorious war must be carried to the enemy. Atomic bombs 
are tremendously expensive. The number will always be too limited 
to waste any trying to hit a target thousands of miles away when 
we have the means of getting much closer. Germany alone ab­
sorbed the equivalent of 200 atomic bombs in the last war. Indeed 
Mr. P. M., S. Plunkett, Nobel prize winner and famous physicist, 
puts the number in the thousands, but choosing the lesser number, 
we do not now have that many nor does it appear that we have 
any expectation of ever having that many in the future. But, even 
if we do, we must not waste them in a long range effort. 
And so, in conclusion, we find that theface of the globe has 
not changed, though many have chosen to ignore the continued 
existence of the oceans and seas. Even the pictures in our mag­
azines which so vividly portray the world as round are actually 
misleading. They usually show the part of the world that is land. 
They make us forget that three-fourths of the earth's surface is 
covered by water, and only one-quarter by land. 
New weapons and the increased efficiency of land, sea and 
air transportation, have all served to complicate modern living, but 
they have not changed the basic facts of life, either in peace or 
war. The coming of age of air power as a decisive w:'eapon of 
war, is of enormous and far reaching conseque_nces. I, as one who 
has spent a quarter of a century in aviation, would be the last to 
deprecate this fact. But the case for sea power was never so 
strong as it is today. We can lose another war if we ever permit 
ourselves to forget it. 
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